









































The EU Treaty Reform
Process since 2000:
The Highs and Lows of
Constitutionalising the
European Union
By Dr Thomas Christiansen Dr Thomas Christiansen Dr Thomas Christiansen Dr Thomas Christiansen Dr Thomas Christiansen*1
The period from 2000 to 2008 has seen an extraordinary attempt to formally constitutionalise
the European Union. Building on long-standing traditions within the European project, a
constitutional discourse initiated in the final stages of the Intergovernmental Conference
negotiating the Nice Treaty lead to the so-called “Laeken Process”: the launch of a formalised,
but open debate about the “Future of Europe”, the setting-up of a “Constitutional Convention”
and the negotiation of a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. However, the failure
to ratify this “European Constitution” then threw the entire reform project into doubt. After a
period of “reflection” and subsequent re-negotiation governments agreed a new treaty that
maintained much of the substance of the “constitution”, but avoided the symbolic language that
this had contained. This article charts the highs and lows of this period of treaty reform, arguing
that the constitutionalisation of the EU is best viewed as a long-lasting and gradual process that
is set to continue even if the formal project to adopt a European Constitution will not be re-visited
for some time to come.
debate of the European Union in preparation of Eastern
enlargement. In fact, the launch of the debate occurred
during the final stages of the Nice Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) and was initially seen as an attempt to
achieve a more federalist outcome of that particular IGC.
The nightmare of Nice: The traditional treaty reform The nightmare of Nice: The traditional treaty reform The nightmare of Nice: The traditional treaty reform The nightmare of Nice: The traditional treaty reform The nightmare of Nice: The traditional treaty reform
method reaches its limits method reaches its limits method reaches its limits method reaches its limits method reaches its limits
The impact of the emerging constitutional discourse on the
actual negotiations in the 2000 IGC was in fact minimal,
because the IGC was too advanced in order to be able to
accommodate a return to
broad and far-reaching
questions about the EU’s
foundations. The initial
assessment was, therefore,
that the Nice Treaty was a
defeat for pro-integrationist
forces and served to pre-
serve the status quo. How-
ever, the “defeat” of these
high aspirations was only
temporary, and in fact the
momentum right after the Nice European Council was
gathering for a deeper revision of the treaties. This was
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
An initial observation, when starting to examine recent
developments regarding the constitutional reform process
in the EU, is the recognition that the debate about a
“European Constitution” was deeply embedded in an
existing integration process. The talk about, and the work
on, a constitutional document was indeed a radical departure
from the previous practice of avoiding, at all cost, the
language, symbols and other trappings of statehood. In
spite of this discursive break with the past, there was never
any serious idea to compose such a constitutional document
from scratch. Instead, the
debate about the “European
Constitution” that began
among the European politi-
cal elites in 2000, took
account of the previously
established patterns and
foundations of European
integration. It linked to
previous aspirations of the
European movement, in
particular constitutional
federalism; it build on the advances of European
constitutional law; and it was situated within the reform
The period from 2000 to

































































partly due because the outcome of the Nice European
Council was questionable, both with regard to the content
of the revised Treaty and with regard to the way in which it
had been negotiated. The treaty reform, while having been
launched at a major review of the institutional provisions of
the Union in preparation for enlargement, failed to achieve
this aim, and while there were modest extensions of co-
decision, most other important decisions were postponed
to a future round of reform. The extension of qualified-
majority voting was linked to a new way of calculating the
qualified-majority – a triple majority that actually made
decision-making more cumbersome than the previous
system.
Equally damaging was the actual experience of the final
summit, where negotiators spent three days bargaining
over the final issues, and were seen to be more concerned
about parochial interests rather than the search for workable
solutions for the “new Europe”. France, holding the
Presidency, spent significant diplomatic resources on the
defence of its voting parity with Germany; Belgium did the
same, though with less success, vis-à-vis the Netherlands;
and the then candidate states were seen to be excluded
from the negotiations about arrangements that would
equally apply to them as to the old Member States.
The Nice summit therefore ended not only with an
imperfect treaty, but also with a number of important
“leftovers” requiring further treaty change, with a desire by
many involved in the negotiations to reform the format of
negotiations as well; and with an explicit mandate, contained
in Declaration 23 attached to the Nice Treaty, to launch a
process to engender a wider debate about the “Future of
Europe”. In different circumstances this might not have had
the consequences that it did, but given the contingencies at
the time, these developments set a course for a period of
formal constitutionalisation.
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It was Belgium – one of the more federal-minded Member
States – that held the EU Presidency in the second half of
2001, when the details of this “post-Nice process” where
being worked out. At the Laeken European Council in
December 2001, a rather maximalist interpretation of the
aims of the “post-Nice process” was worked out. This
included the reference to a possible “constitutional
document” in the mandate of the European Convention
that was being agreed on in Laeken. This was then taken
a step further by the Convention itself, which, under the
leadership of Giscard d’Estaing, set itself the aim of
drafting a Constitutional Treaty rather than merely providing
the subsequent IGC with a report or a number of scenarios
– outcomes that would also have been possible under the
Laeken mandate.
At the Laeken Summit, another important decision was
taken, namely the nomination of Valery Giscard d’Estaing
as the Chairman of the Convention, with Jean-Luc Dehaene
and Giuliano Amato, former prime ministers of Belgium
and Italy, respectively, as Vice-Chairs. Giscard d’Estaing
had previously been a French President, but had also
served many years as a member of the European Parliament
and thus combined the roles of representing both Member
State and EU institutional interests. A further important
appointment in the Convention was that of John Kerr, the
former UK Permanent Representative, as Secretary-General.
He brought with him not only close connections to the
British establishment, but also experience and familiarity of
COREPER/Council procedures.
The European Convention thus had a strong leadership,
both in political and administrative terms. Giscard had a
clear vision of the direction he wanted the Convention to
(from left to right) Mr Giuliano Amato, Vice-Chairman; Mr Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Chairman; and Mr Jean-Luc
Dehaene, Vice-Chairman, before the official opening of the inaugural session of the European Convention, 28 February
2002.





























































































go, and even though he suffered certain setbacks in the
closing stages of the Convention, his agenda of formally
constitutionalising the European Union did resonate with
the membership of the Convention.2 The Convention was
made up of representatives of national governments,
members of the European Commission, members of
national parliaments and of the European Parliament, and
even though there were differences among its members
about the substance of any draft Constitutional Treaty,
Giscard’s approach of seeking “consensus” (rather than
the more formal unanimity
or majority-voting) proved
to be effective in achieving a
final agreement.
The members of the
Convention organised them-
selves in a number of
working groups on specific,
mainly sectoral issues, but
due to the parliamentary
majority of the membership
there was also a strong party-
political dimension to the
Convention’s work. In the final analysis, though, the Con-
vention was very much a top-down affair, with a “Praesi-
dium” bringing together 12 key members of the Con-
vention steering the drafting of the new Treaty (Kleine
2007). This Praesidium, which – unlike the plenary sessions
or the working groups who met in private – was supported
by a very effective secretariat composed of officials from the
Commission, the EP Secretariat and, above all, the Council
Secretariat (Deloche-Gaudez 2007).
Giscard’s handling of the Convention was controversial,
partly because his constitutional ambitions so explicitly
went beyond the kind of treaty reform that had been initially
expected. While the draft treaty ultimately did include a lot
of the language of statehood (flags, symbols, a European
President and Foreign Minister, European laws, a supremacy
of EU law clause), he did not succeed with proposals for a
renaming of the Union to the “United States of Europe”. He
was also heavy-handed in the use of his procedural
resources, frequently ignoring opposition from the floor in
favour of his own preferences with regards to specific
aspects of the treaty, the preamble being a case in point.
Finally, he was criticised towards the end of the Convention,
when he was seen to consult extensively with national
governments, anticipating their views in advance of the
subsequent IGC, at the expense of listening to opinion
within the Convention.
The European Convention was not the “deliberative
forum” that many constitutionalists had hoped to see
(Eriksen et al 2004; Panke 2006). There was a certain
degree of deliberation, but negotiations about the final
draft treaty were neither fully transparent nor did they
necessary reflect the substantive work that had taken place
in the working groups. Even so, when the Convention had
completed its work in the summer of 2003, it did achieve
two significant objectives: first, to have been able to agree
on a single, comprehensive draft treaty, and, second, to
have set the agenda for the Constitutional IGC that followed
the Convention, and that had the formal power to agree on
changes to the treaty (Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005;
Church and Phinnemore 2006).
Treaty reform always implies an agenda-setting phase,
and it is possible to see the Convention as simply a forum
for more systematic setting of an agenda. Earlier IGCs had
been preceded by reflection groups, and one perspective
on the Convention is to see it as a “super reflection group”.
However, given the strength of opinion, the detailed work
and the high degree of consensus that had been achieved
in the Convention, the approach of the Italian Presidency
to minimise any changes to the draft Treaty in the IGC
appeared as an obvious choice. The Convention Draft did
indeed constitute the basis of negotiations in the IGC, and
even though the Italian strategy of seeking to avoid the “re-
opening” of individual art-
icles appeared to fail when
the December 2003 summit
ended without agreement,
the subsequent Irish Presi-
dency succeeded in getting
agreement on a revised
version of the draft treaty,
approved at the final summit
in June 2004. Heads of State
or Government then met in
Rome in October 2004 for a
formal signing ceremony of
the “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” – a
document that thereafter was widely referred to as the
“European Constitution”.
While a lot of work, energy, diplomatic skill and other
resources had gone into drafting this treaty, the process
was still not complete without ratification. Given the
constitutional aspirations of the Treaty, it generated
significant public interest and in a large number of Member
States a popular referendum was seen as the ratification
method of choice. This not only included countries that had
regularly held referendums in the past, but also several
others which had not previously submitted EU matters to
such a test, and indeed some where referendums had never
been held before. The Netherlands was one such case in
point. France and the UK had both called referendums for
reasons that were regarded as more politically than legally
motivated, and in both cases doubts were raised about the
likelihood of achieving a positive result of such a vote.3
The “failure” of the Constitutional Treaty: The limits of The “failure” of the Constitutional Treaty: The limits of The “failure” of the Constitutional Treaty: The limits of The “failure” of the Constitutional Treaty: The limits of The “failure” of the Constitutional Treaty: The limits of
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In the end, it was first in the Netherlands, at the end of May
2005, and a few days later in France, that the electorates
of two of the original Member States voted against the
Constitutional Treaty. Analysis of the voting intentions and
of the public debate in these countries has sought to show
that the result was less a verdict on the actual text of the
treaty, but was best explained by a variety of factors which
included both European and domestic issues. While the
“no” votes in these two countries were a severe shock to the
“system”, there was nevertheless an immediate reflex by
the EU institutions to persist with the ratification process,
and indeed several countries did ratify the Constitutional
Treaty in subsequent months, including Luxembourg by
referendum. After all, there were precedents when initial
“no” votes had been subsequently overturned, after domestic
politics had had a chance to react and make arrangements
for a second vote that would assure a more favourable
reception.4
There was also, however, a sense that the opposition to
the Constitutional Treaty had been so strong in these two
The European Convention

























































































































countries, and that these countries were so central to the
European project, that it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to overcome this double “no”. In addition, a number of
Member States decided to put their referendums on hold
after the rejection of the treaty in France and the Netherlands.
A more concerted effort was therefore perceived to be
necessary in order to keep the constitutional project going.
Both the European Commission and the Member States
acted in response to the “constitutional crisis”. The
Commission identified a gap in the communication between
the EU and the citizens, and launched a programme aimed
at enhancing the opportunity for dialogue between citizens
and elites, the so-called “Plan D” (Wallström 2007). Coming
together in the European Council in 2005, governments
agreed that what was needed was a “reflection period”,
which would last until 2007 and enable a possible re-
negotiation of the treaty in time for the next EP elections in
2009. This period of “reflection” about the future of the
constitutional project would also, and conveniently, include
the national elections that were due in both France and the
Netherlands, thus allowing the new governments to present
the European issue differently to their electorates.
The reflection period, which lasted from mid-2005 to
mid-2007, served the actors to buy time. During this
period, the Union celebrated its 50th anniversary, which
included the adoption of a “solemn declaration” in Berlin
about the Union’s values and aims, and thus provided a text
with some constitutional principles (Presidency of the
European Union 2007). In terms of treaty change, the
realisation by early 2007 was clearly that, despite previous
statements to the contrary, a re-negotiation of the treaty
was both necessary and possible. The German and the
Portuguese Presidencies collaborated closely in order to
launch a new IGC in the summer of 2007 – Berlin
managing to get agreement on an extremely detailed
mandate for the IGC, and Lisbon then following up on this
with a conference that was concluded in the second half of
the year.
Agreement on the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutionalisation in Agreement on the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutionalisation in Agreement on the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutionalisation in Agreement on the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutionalisation in Agreement on the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutionalisation in
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The Lisbon Treaty was signed by the Heads of State or
Governments in December 2007. A number of factors
facilitated this process: there had indeed been the anticipated
change in domestic politics in key countries, namely in
France with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President. EU
enlargement, which had been one of the main reasons that
were given for the need of a fundamental, constitutional
overhaul of the Union, and which had been one reason for
the opposition towards the Constitutional Treaty, had
happened without the Union suffering any immediate or
obvious negative effects as a result,5 and Turkish accession
to the EU, while still on the agenda, had clearly moved into
the background of public deliberation. Above all there had
been a growing acceptance among the EU’s political elite
that, while a reform of the treaty was still seen to be
necessary, that this should preferably not be presented as
a constitutional project. Ratification of “ordinary” treaty
change would be more easily achieved if referendums
could be avoided, and for this to be the case, the language
of constitutionalism had to be replaced.
This reversal from the high degree of politicisation that
treaty reform had “enjoyed” during and after the European
Convention, to the active de-politicisation of negotiations
towards a “Reform Treaty” is remarkable,6 as is the fact that
substantively the vast majority of provisions that had been
contained in the Constitutional Treaty were included in the
Lisbon Treaty.7 The Treaty contains key elements of the
original Treaty that would need to be regarded as
constitutional:
• The President of the European Council will be chosen by
the Heads of State or Government for a term of 30
months. This office does not empower the elected top
politician to take any executive decisions. Furthermore,
the Presidency system will be revised, with representatives
from three Member States jointly running sectoral Council



































































































meetings over period of 18 months.
• The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission
will combine the functions of the current High Represent-
ative and the External Relations Commissioner. The
powers of the High Representative are limited to
implement policies, but he or she will play an important
role in representing the EU globally.
• The  President of the European Commission will be
elected by the European Parliament, based on a proposal
from the European Council. The size of the College will
be reduced from 2014 onwards. Only two-thirds of
Member States will have a Commissioner at any one
time, rotating every 5 years.
• The Commission’s delegations will form part of a
“European External Action Service” of the Union and will
come under the joint responsibility of the Council and
the Commission.
• The European Parliament, comprising 750 members
and a President, will gain further powers as the co-
decision procedure becomes the “ordinary legislative
procedure” and is expanded to further areas.
Additionally, the new budgetary procedure requires
approval by both the Council of Ministers and the
Parliament.
• National parliaments also get more involved in the
legislative process. They are to be notified of proposed
legislation and have eight weeks to deliver their
comments.8
• Qualified-majority voting was extended to new policy
areas. As from 2014, a new voting system shall be
introduced: a vote is passed if 55% of Member States are
in favour and if these countries represent 65% of the
EU’s population – an element that makes the size of the
country’s population much more important.
• The European Court of Justice is granted enhanced
powers to rule on cases dealing with EU Justice and
Home Affairs legislation.9 The Charter of Fundamental
Rights, agreed in 2000 as a “solemn proclamation”, will
become legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty.10
Ratification of this Treaty remains, of course, an important
issue, but the changes that national governments have
made to the domestic arrangements make an ultimate
adoption of the treaty by all
Member States more likely.
All Member States except
Ireland have decided to rely
on parliamentary ratification
alone – something that is
especially remarkable in
countries like Poland, Den-
mark and the UK, which had
been previously committed
to referendums on the
Constitutional Treaty.
Beyond the Irish refer-
endum, there is also the possibility for judicial review of the
Treaty by national supreme courts, a scenario that might be
likely in both Germany and the Czech Republic. Overall,
the chances of ratification are uncertain, but appear to be
significantly higher than they were for the Constitutional
Treaty.11
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
While the outcome of ratification, at the time of writing in
early 2008, cannot be predicted, we can say that the Union
appears to have found a way out of the constitutional
impasse. The three elements that formalised constitutional-
isation after the Nice Treaty – the use of the convention
method for deliberation of treaty changes, the adoption of
a language of constitutionalism, and – at least in many
Member States, the search for legitimation of treaty change
through public referendums – have not been present in the
(negotiation of) the new treaty. Instead, the Lisbon Treaty
has reverted back to the pre-Laeken practice with regards
to language, negotiation method and ratification format,
even though in substance it maintains the constitutional
elements that the formal “constitution” contained.
This observation demonstrates that the Lisbon Treaty is,
indeed, “constitutionalisation without the name” – the
continuation of a process that began decades ago and is
being carried forward despite the “failure” of the formal
project to design a “European Constitution”. Our analysis,
on the basis of a conceptualisation developed elsewhere,12
has demonstrated that neither was the Constitutional Treaty
a radical break with the past, nor was the Lisbon Treaty a
radical break with the constitutional project. In both cases
there was a huge shift in the degree of formalisation of the
constitutional process – a shift that, as the politics in the
ratification phase have shown, has been hugely significant
– but it did not change the underlying trend towards greater
constitutionalisation. The thesis of a continuous process of
constitutionalisation in the European Union, taking different
forms at different times, is therefore confirmed rather than
disproved by the experience of treaty reform since the turn
of the century.
In terms of the future outlook, we can say that the signs
are that constitutionalisation will continue further, but no
formal constitutional project and probably no “ordinary”
treaty reforms either, are likely to occur in the near future,
for a number of reasons. Given the tortuous process by
which the Union managed to arrive at the Lisbon Treaty,
there is a certain degree of treaty reform fatigue detectable,
both among governments and electorates. Even if the
Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to last the “50 years” which Giscard
d’Estaing had predicted the Constitutional Treaty would
last without revision, govern-
ments will seek to avoid
another, major treaty reform
in the foreseeable future.
The Lisbon Treaty is, in many
ways, a much more funda-
mental overhaul of institu-
tions and procedures than
either the Amsterdam Treaty
or the Nice Treaty were. The
Lisbon Treaty also includes
a new article concerning the
changes to the treaty revision
procedure. This article (Art.33) provides for both an ordinary
and a simplified procedure for changing the treaties. This
means that a major reform project would – again – require
the convening of a European Convention, but it would also
allow minor reform steps to be taken using a simplified
procedure, the so-called passarelle clause, which allows
the European Council, acting unanimously, to make changes
to parts of the treaty, for example with regard to the
Treaty reform is best viewed
in terms of a continuous
process of  constitutional-
















































































extension of the ordinary legislative procedure into new
areas.
If and when the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, there is then an
expectation that constitutionalisation will continue further,
even if the formal method of Constitutional Convention
and Intergovernmental Conference is not applied. Thus,
having moved from a fairly informal process of
constitutionalisation to become highly formal and politicised
in the context of the Constitutional Treaty, constitutional-
isation is again reverting to a less formal process in the
wake of the ratification failure of that treaty.
This analysis of EU treaty reform from Nice to Lisbon, via
Laeken, demonstrates that there is a very close linkage
between treaty reform and constitutionalisation. Treaty
reform itself is best viewed in terms of a continuous process
of constitutionalisation has both formal and informal
dimensions. Looking at the period from the mid 1980s until
today, it is evident that treaty reform has been a constant
feature of the political life of the Union during this time. The
project to draft and adopt a “European Constitution” must
be seen in this context: it built on the previous rounds of
treaty reform, and fuelled further treaty reform after the
“constitution” itself failed (Christiansen and Reh forth-
coming). The “Constitutional Treaty” may have turned out
to be a brief episode in the integration process, but
constitutionalisation, albeit under a different name, is very
much alive and present.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Dr Thomas Christiansen, Senior Lecturer, Unit “European
Decision-Making”, EIPA.
1 The argument of this article is based on a book publication
(Christiansen and Reh, forthcoming) where these themes are
elaborated in detail. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance provided by Johanna Oettel.
2 For a detailed examination of the proceedings of the
Convention, see Norman (2005); for an analysis of Giscard’s
leadership, see Kleine (2007).
3 For a detailed discussion of the motivations behind individual
countries’ choices in favour of holding referendums, see Closa
(2007).
4 Denmark initially voted ‘no” on the Maastricht Treaty, and
then ratified the Treaty after a second, favourable referendum,
and the Irish government lost a referendum on the Nice Treaty,
which was then overturned in a second referendum.
5 See Best et al. (forthcoming) for a discussion of the impact that
EU enlargement has had on the workings of the key institutions
in the European Union. The contributors conclude that there
is no significant detrimental effect on the efficient function of
the EU institutions.
6 In the Lisbon Treaty IGC, the political level was almost entirely
absent and detailed negotiations on the basis of the June
2007 mandate were conducted by a group of legal experts
that was chaired, not by the Presidency, but by a senior official
of the Council Secretariat.
7 Most observers agree that the Lisbon Treaty is essentially the
Constitutional Treaty, minus the name, the flag/symbols
clause, the title of the Foreign Minister and the terminology for
EU legislative acts. Ways of “measuring” the degree of
congruence between the two treaties differ, but according to
some analysts the Lisbon Treaty is more than 90 per cent
identical with the Constitutional Treaty.
8 When one-third of national parliaments object to a proposal,
the Commission has to consider whether to maintain, amend
or withdraw the legislative proposal; when the majority of the
national parliaments object, and the Commission still wants to
press ahead with its proposal, the European Parliament, and
the Council consider both sides of the argument and come up
with a decision.
9 Special provisions were given to Denmark and the United
Kingdom.
10 Special provisions were given to Poland and the United
Kingdom.
11 See Hagemann (2007).
12 See Christiansen and Reh (forthcoming).
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